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Abstract-Using an optimal control macroeconomic model of the ~a.u.di Arabian _economy, the Saudi 
Arabian Third Five Year Plan (1980-1985) is examined for goal feas1b1hty and possible tradeoffs among 
the plan's major goals. . . 
The main conclusions reached by the analysis are that: (l) some mflattonnary pressures can be reduced 
with a greater than planned infusion and or retainment of foreign workers; ~2) wit~ th~ lab?r force 
increasing in the 4-5% range, a rate .of arou°:d 6% real _growth might ?e achieved wit~ ~nfla_tton held 
around 8%, together with a gradual mcrease m the relative share of pnvate sector parttc1patton. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over 10 yr ago the presentation of the eleventh 
annual report of the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency included this quotation from the Koran: 
"Verily, never will God change the condition of a 
people until they change it themselves." Throughout 
the third plan, more than in any of its precursors, it 
is this theme of change and responsive participation 
in change which is dominant as exemplified 
in the introductory statement of development 
philosophy: "strategic priority to structural change 
rather than to growth" and "the spontaneous 
response from society ... to the opportunities 
offered by development (1). 
Although the weakening of oil markets in 1982 and 
the lowering of oil prices beginning in 1983 meant 
that Saudi Arabia's oil revenues have declined con-
siderably through the third plan the country's rela-
tively small population (about 7 million) together 
with its vast foreign portfolio (at least $200 billion) 
have allowed the country to maintain its planned 
level of expenditures. 
It will be some time before a complete ex post 
assessment of the plan's performance can be made. 
Preliminary to this assessment, this paper comtnents 
on and assesses the third five year development plan 
(1980-1985) from a macroeconomic point of view-
in terms of the plan's feasibility of attainment and 
consistency with regard to the macro investments 
used and the plan's ultimate objectives. 
OVERVIEW OF THE THIRD PLAN 
S.E.P.S. "l0/4--A 
implied in the plan is the country's major long term 
objective, that of containing and eve,ntually reducing 
the size of the foreign labor force. In contrast to the 
second plan's emphasis on infrastructure devel-
opment designed to increase the absorptive capacity 
of the economy, the emphasis of the new plan is 
largely on raising the efficient utilization of the labor 
force-domestic and foreign alike-in hydrocarbons 
(usually high capital intensive) and other manu-
facturing industries (especially in the agricultural and 
mining sectors). As in the past the overall goal is to 
diversify the economic bases of the nation. 
While the third five year plan is undoubtedly a 
more sophisticated document than either the first or 
second, nevertheless it does retain much of character 
of a project's list, with its financial implications not 
completely [3] worked out. Moreover, the plan seems 
to suffer from a weakness noted in the previous ones, 
namely that although manpower, infrastructure and 
other obstacles to economic development are ac-
knowledged, they are not included in the central 
projections. Undoubtedly, this is in part a reflection 
of the dichotomy between economic rationality and 
political experience that exists in the kingdom. In 
support of the third plan, it should be said that a 
detailed review and updating is planned after 2 yr 
elapsed and that the planners themselves are openly 
advocating "roll-over" planning on a year by year 
basis as a much more appropriate approach to devel-
opment in the case of a rapidly changing and still 
largely uncharted economy like Saudi Arabia's [3]. 
Specifically, with regard to the plan itself, three 
medium range objectives have been identified and 
targeted: the structural change of the economy, t~e 
achievement of participation and social welfare m 
development, and greater economic and adminis-
trative efficiency. 
In the analysis that follows attention will be largely 
focused on the structural change aspect of the model. 
Here Saudi policies are linked to three areas of 
economic activity: oil and gas production; the expan-
sion of productive sel:Cors in agriculture, mining and 
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industry; and the continued development of in-
frastructure. 
Clearly the on going and primary goal of the 
government, that of economic diversification, re-
quires development of the agricultural, industrial and 
mining sectors (Table 1). In the government view, the 
private sector can and ultimately should be re-
sponsible for the bulk of output in these sectors. The 
government envisions its role largely as a catalyst to 
private sector entreprenurial activity and investment 
in these areas through its provision of information 
and research results, of a supportive financial frame-
work and investment incentives, and through the 
provision of the required infrastructure. Given the 
government's commitment to free enterprise and 
market forces, a major objective of the country's 
development strategy is therefore the rapid displace-
ment of government sector activity in GDP by that 
of the private sector. 
In contrast to nearly all other Third World devel-
opment plans, if the third plan fails to achieve its 
targets in the time frame alloted, it will not be due to 
financial limitations. Instead, inflationary pressures 
and productivity lags will ultimately the plan's likely 
course and eventual attainment. 
Excessive inflation has been acknowledged in third 
plan as an area requiring constant government atten-
tion. Anti-inflationary policy during the second plan 
period included the introduction of subsidies on 
various items such as housing and essential foods. In 
the upcoming 5 yr, the government intends to dras-
tically reduce or even abolish these subsidies. Politi-
cally, this action will be possible only if the govern-
ment can restrain expenditures and thereby keep 
inflation within acceptable bounds-7-10%. 
In many respects [l, p. 57] the quite short Sub-
section 3.5, Inflation in Chapt. 3, Strategy for the 
Third Plan is the most illuminating single passage in 
the entire plan document, since within it is contained 
an appreciation of all the forces which have led to the 
current development formula. These include: 
(1) the gap between government financed demand 
on the one hand and the required supply of goods, 
services and labor on the other; 
(2) a steep rise in the level of government ex-
penditure could generate serious inflationary pres-
sures; 
(3) the danger depends not so much on the pres-
sures of demand for goods and services as on that for 
skilled manpower; 
(4) outside the government there could be 
inflationary pressures arising from the private sector's 
own autonomous development; and 
(5) the rate at which important inflation could 
affect the domestic cost and price levels remains 
subject to the efficiency of protective measures. 
Each of these statements provides a valuable lead 
into the plan and the opportunities and problems 
which face the kingdom. 
The third plan's development strategy largely re-
volves around rapid increases in productivity (Table 
1 ). It is estimated that had not the second plan 
achieved the productivity increases it did, the labor 
force requirements would have been more than twice 
what they were. Similarly, the expected increase in 
productivity in the third plan would translate into 
550,000 fewer workers needed-a figure of 
significance when compared to the 155,000 projected 
as required for the period. As the participation rate 
of the Saudis in the labor force has been declining 
slightly, the bulk of the workers who would be hired 
in the absence of increased productivity would be 
foreign [4). It should be noted that the decline in 
Saudi participation is a direct result of the expansion 
of the kingdom's education and training programs. 
Capital and skill intensive improvements and de-
velopments within each of the specific sectors will 
form the source for productivity growth. Despite 
continued out-migration of labor, agriculture is ex-
pected to contribute a significant amount to the 
country's productivity improvement. High prod-
uctivity projects, financed with the aid of the Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund, provide the major 
impetus on which manufacturing is to achieve its 
targeted increases in productivity. 
MACROECONOMIC LINKAGES 
The estimated structural equations attempts to 
capture several of the more important linkages be-
tween government activity, economic growth and 
inflation. 
Government spending (Table 2) has grown consid-
erably over the last few years, with domestic spending 
fluctuating in part as a means of stabilizing the price 
Table I. Growth targets for non-oil economy 1980-1985 (% growth yr) 























































Source: EIU Special Report No. 116 Saudia Arabia: The Development 
Dilemma. 
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Table 2. Saudi Arabia: government cash-flow spending 1977-1981 (billions of riyals) 
1. Government spending 
2. Total cash-flow spending 
(a) Direct foreign exchange spending 
(b) Domestic spending 
3. Domestic revenue 
4. Net cash-flows through government spending 
Annual rates of growth 
1. Government spending 
2. Total cash-How spending 
(a) Direct foreign exchange spending 
(b) Domestic spending 
3. Domestic revenue 
4. Net cash-flows through government spending 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
128.3 138.0 145.0 188.4 236.6 
104.9 142.2 148.9 178.2 230.7 
39.6 43.9 46.0 43.3 73.8 
65.3 98.3 10.2 134.9 156.9 
3.3 4.9 6.4 7.2 9.1 































Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report 1401 (1981), p. 2. 
level (as evidenced in public statement and the fairly 
close relationship (Table 3) between government do-
mestic spending and the net cash flow~ through 
government spending). 
Imports have played a large role in reducing do-
mestic inflationary pressure (Table 3). At the same 
time increases in world prices are directly transmitted 
into the domestic economy. For example in 1981 
(1400/01) imports (CIF) of the non-oil private sector 
increased by 21 % to Rls 101.6 billion. Ajusting these 
for the rise of 9.6% in dollar-based CIF import prices 
and for the appreciation of l % in the exchange rate 
of the riyal against the dollar, the growth in real 
imports was about 11 %. Consequent to the rise of 
8.6% in riyal import prices and of7.8% in the non-oil 
GDF deflator, the average cost of supplies rose by 
8.3%. 
However, the cost of living index is estimated to 
have risen by only 3.6%. This is because of a number 
of factors including the lower average of the basket 
of goods and services included in the cost of living 
index compared with that covered by both the non-
oil GDP and imports, and the substantial weight in 
the index for rents, which have been declining, and a 
number of essential items subsidized by the govern-
ment. 
The government has been the major source of 
increased private sector liquidity (M3) (Tables 4-6). 
Of the gross liquidity pumped into the economy over 
the 10 yr, 94% came from government cash flows and 
only 6% from commercial bank credit. About 86% 
of these gross liquidity flows was absorbed by net 
private sector balance of payments deficit leaving a 
balance of 14% for increase in M3. 
During the second plan period the government's 
share of gross liquidity flow was even higher (95%) 
and a greater proportion of these (87%) was ab-
sorbed by private sector balance of payments deficit. 
The government appreciates the fact that in an 
economy like that of Saudi Arabia, government 
domestic spending exercises a dominant influence on 
money supply growth. As noted when the 
inflationary pressures increase (Table 9) the govern-
ment usually places primary reliance on fiscal policy. 
Because of the strong link between government 
spending and the money supply, and given the free-
dom from all restrictions on foreign exchange trans-
fers, the role of monetary policy has been limited 
in Saudi Arabia and major changes in monetary 
expansion have been brought about through the 
regulation of government spending. This role of 
fiscal policy will continue to be important even in 
the near future [5]. 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
The above trends immediately raise the issue of 
whether from an institutional perspective Saudi policy 
makers have adequate tools to implement the goals 
of the third plan while at the same time achieving 
their aims of price stability, strong positive growth · 
rates in the non-oil private sector, increased private 
fixed capital formation, moderate interest rates, a 
good supply of domestic liquidity (to lubricate the 
kingdom's rapid economic expansion), and a 
predictable-if not stable-riyal exchange rate. 
Starting with the exchange rate SAMA prefers a 
predictable riyal, as this helps traders who might 
otherwise be exposed to fluctuations in the rate. 
SAMA's policy is to peg the riyal within a narrow 
trading band to the International Monetary Fund's 
Special Drawing Right (SDR). However, the mon-
etary authorities also want to keep riyal movements 
under control. The SDR has recently been moving 
erratically because of the general turbulence of for-
eign exchange markets. As a result SAMA's policy of 
adjusting the riyal to new parities slowly, means that 
in the first half of 1981 re-evaluations of exactly 100 
points were made nearly every week [6]. On the whole 
it appears that the authorities are in control of the 
riyal rate and that exchange policy per se should not 
limit the policy makers in striving to achieve the third 
plan's goals. 
As noted above, fiscal policy is also hampered by 
planning commitments. The fiscal balance is heavily 
if not overwhelmingly influenced by the 5 yr spending 
targets. These do not allow conventional fine tuning 
measures. 
Nevertheless, the way in which the funds are dis-
bursed acts a shorter term regulatory valve on private 
sector activity and consumption. Since the steep 
inflation of the 1970s, the finance ministry has im-
posed strict control over funds' allocation to spend-
ing departments. Delaying payments helps to prevent 
over-stimulation. 
The government has shown it is prepared to cut 
spending programs to stop inflation. In the mid- l 970s 
prices rose by nearly 50% a year and threatened to 
undermine the development strategy. Budget cuts 
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helped reduce inflationary pressures. These policies 
can be used again if the economy shows signs of 
running out of control. However, the option is be-
coming increasingly unattractive because of the pri-
vate sector's continued dependence on the flow of 
public spending; i.e. tight fiscal policy could greatly 
hinder the continued development of many infant 
manufacturing industries which low cost government 
funds are helping to bring to maturity. 
One feature of the Saudi economy is its negligible 
taxation, and thus limited means of regulating eco-
nomic activity-particularly consumption. On the 
political side, any suggestion that government should 
attempt to take spending power out of the economy 
through higher taxes would likely be extremely un-
popular [6]. 
Constraints on using fiscal instruments places a 
greater burden on monetary policy as an economic 
stabilizer. As with fiscal policy, however, there are 
few instruments available. A major problem is that 
the government does not issue debt such as treasury 
bills. In part the absence of government debt stems 
from the fact that there is no need to borrow to 
finance government spending [7]. More important is 
the fact that Sharia law does not allow interest 
payments. 
The restriction prevents SAMA from using open 
market operations to drain liquidity from the bank-
ing system and rediscounting paper at penal interest 
rates to control bank lending. In effect two of the 
most powerful monetary tools available to most 
modern central banks cannot be used in Saudi Ara-
bia. 
SAMA exercises control through reserve require-
ments and through "moral suasion." As of mid-1981 
the main regulation; were: 
(1) a 7% reserve requirement on demand and 
savings deposits. This was relaxed from 15% in 1980 
to help to relieve a liquidity shortage; 
(2) a ceiling on the deposit-to-capital ratio of 15 to 
l; and 
(3) the requirement that the equivalent of 25% of 
deposits must be held in liquid assets-deposits with 
SAMA, cash and callable loans. 
Despite the shortage of policy instruments, the 
Saudi economy has performed exceptionally well in 
the past. The government has been able to contain 
inflation while at the same time the private sector 
appears to have had access to the credit it requires for 
continued expansion. If the third plan period does 
not encounter any major unforeseen shocks, the 
policy tools available to the authorities should prove 
adequate for manipulating the economy. 
MACROECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS 
The macroeconomic model developed below is 
designed to examine economy from the point of view 
of the resources and requirements associated with 
alternative growth scenarios. Ultimately within the 
framework of an optimal control program, it is 
capable of distinguishing the most efficient growth 
path to the end targets. The model's forecast deter-
mines the non-oil income growth rate, the inflation 
Saudi Arabia's third five year plan 185 
Table 4. Saudi Arabia: factors affecting private sector liquidity, first and second plan periods 1970--1980 (billions of riyals) 
Plan I Plan II Total Plan I Plan II Total 
(1970--75) (1975-80) 
I. Increase in gross private sector liquidity 43.9 445.8 489.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(a) Government cash flows 40.1 422.0 462.1 91.3 94.7 94.4 
(b) Government bank credit 3.8 23.8 27.6 8.7 5.3 5.6 
2. Net private sector balance of payments deficit 32.9 387.2 420.1 74.9 86.9 85.8 
3. Increase in private sector liquidity MS (1-2) · 11.0 58.6 69.6 25.I 13.1 14.2 
(a) Money Ml 8.4 45.0 53.4 19.1 JO.I 10.9 
(b) Quasi money 2.6 13.6 16.2 5.9 3.1 3.1 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report 1400 (1980), p. 15. 
rate and foreign workforce implications of alternative 
spending rates. 
The model is based on the assumptions that [8]: 
(l) only a limited number of exogenous variables 
determine all the kingdom's basic macro variables; 
(2) government expenditures follow a pattern (al-
beit at a higher level) similar to that over the 
1960-1979 period; 
(3) that there are no major alterations in world 
economic conditions during this period; 
(4) that the current world oil glut will continue 
throughout the third plan period (1981-1985). 
Also implicit in the model is the presumption that 
the public sector's role in Saudi Arabia will continue 
to increase in the third development plan reflecting 
the government's commitment to long term structural 
change. Government involvement in the economy 
manifests itself in a greater provision of' financial 
support and social services. It also involvesd more 
government intervention in every sector of the econ-
omy to ensure that the plan's aims are being fulfilled. 
In short the model assumes a constant infusion of 
government expenditures into the economy. Further-
more, that government financed demand in Saudi 
Arabia has its own rather special characteristics 
which are determined fundamentally by the nature of 
the national economy; i.e. that the economy will 
remain incapable of self-sustained growth without 
continuous government demand manipulation. In 
this regard, while a breakdown of the contribution to 
the GDP by the oil and non-oil sectors of the 
economy at the beginning and of the third plan 
estimates that the value of the former in relation to 
the latter will decline from 165 to 130%, this grossly 
underestimates the importance of natinal revenue 
ultimately derived from the export sale of oil. IMF 
estimates of 92% of total revenues from oil exports, 
as against 8% from investment income in 1975, 
provide a more accurate order of magnitude that is 
unlikely to have changed significantly. The third plan 
statistics themselves indicate very clearly that if one 
isolates the reasonable autonomous producing, com-
mercial and financial sectors in the GDP from those 
which are ultimately reliant on demand created gov-
ernment oil revenues, the estimates of the propor-
tional importance of the former are of the order of 
no more than 20% at the beginning and 25% at the 
end of the planning period [I, p. 58]. 
The econometric model used to depict the major 
economic forces at work in the economy was esti-
mated (Table 7) by a 2 stage least squares estimation 
procedure with annual data over the period 
1960-1979 [9], its main features include: 
Table 5. Saudi Arabia: factors affecting changes in M3 (billions of riyals) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 
I. Gross liquidity flows 61.8 96.2 105.0 137.2 
(a) Cash flows through government 
spending net loans disbursed 
by government-sponsored credit 
institutions 61.9 93.4 96.5 127.7 
(b) Increase in commercial bank claims 
on the private sector -0.1 2.8 8.5 9.5 
2. Private sector balance of payments deficit -48.3 -84.7 -97.5 -127.1 
3. Other items (net) -0.6 4.8 0.3 1.2 
4. Increase in M3 12.9 16.3 7.8 11.3 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report 140 I ( 1981 ), p. 8. 
Table 6. Saudi Arabia: money supply and real money demand 1977-1981 (average annual 
rate of growth) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
I. M3 52.7 43.6 14.5 18.4 20.4 
2. Real supplies of goods and services 30.6 21.8 9.7 13.6 11.5 
3. Inflationary gap 22.1 11.8 4.8 4.8 8.9 
4. Non-oil GDP deflator 22.4 16.0 7.3 8.3 7.8 
5. Important price index 4.9 11.0 11.7 14.3 8.6 
6. Supply deflator 11.7 11.6 9.5 10.0 8.3 
7. Cost of living index 25.4 4.4 6.1 1.8 3.6 
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(1) 17 real (constant 1970) national income ac-
counting equations (equations 1-17) and 3 (equations 
18-20) nominal monetary features; 
(2) a distinction between oil (equations 15) income 
(OGDPNP) and non-oil (equation 16) gross domestic 
product (NOXNP); 
(5) a causal monetary link (equations 18-21) be-
tween government nominal expenditures (GENAN) 
government deposits in the banking system 
(SGD), reserve money (SRM), the money supply 
(M2), and inflation-the non-oil GDP deflator 
(NODF). 
(3) the influence of government expenditures 
(L\GENANP) on private consumption (PCNP, equa-
tion 1), reflecting perhaps public-private competition 
for resources---<:rowding out of private consumption; 
(6) the influence of world inflation (ICEUV) on the 
terms of trade (TT) and thus gives domestic product 
(equation 17). 
(4) the use of numerous dummy variables 
(Dl ... DS) to depict various structural changes oc-
curring in the 1970s; 
(7) a series of exogenous variables, oil price (OilP), 
and export unit values (EUV) depicting the slow-
down in world oil demand, and; 
(8) the third plan goal of reducing foreign work 
Table 7. Saudi Arabia: keynesian forecasting model (two stage least squares estimates) 
Real Variable Block 
1. Private consumption (PCNP) = 0.67CNPL + 0.30NOXP - 0.44GENANP + 0.068 
(4.74) (4.48) (-3.63) (0.21) 
2. Private investment (IPP) = 0.11 NOXNPL + I. 77D3 + 0.33 
(6.42) . (8.57) (2.71) 
3. Government consumption (GCNP) = 0.65GCNPL + 0.57IGP + 0.67 
(2.81) (2.23) (1.60) 
4. Change in stocks (ISNP) = 0.044NOXNP - 0.21 
(2.95) ( -1.18) 
5. Government non-oil revenue (GNREVP) = 0.1lNOXNP+1.2703 + 0.27 
(4.14) (3.62) (1.39) 
6. Government oil revenue (GOREVP) = 7.45VPE + 6.76TT + 25.2703 - 6.61 
(2.62) (5.30) (9.87) (-4.35) 
7. Imports (ZNANP) = -2.84TINP + 2.01 
(-49.17) (4.97) 
8. Exports (EP) = 30.23VPE + t.950ILP - 5.03 
(4.91) (5.44) (-1.60) 
9. Net factor payments (NFPP) = -0.032EP - 4.08 
(4.17) (-3.58) 
10. Private savings (PSPP) = 0.80BNOXNP - 2.06 
(5.38) (- 1.16) 
11. Government savings (GSP) = 0.71GREVP- l.01GENANP + 3.31 
(6.83) (-3.31) (2.31) 
12. Investment in oil sector (IOP) = 0.34IOPL + 0.57CPP - 0.16 
13. SAMMA Domestic assets (SDAP) = 0.98NSFAP + 0.52GENANP- 1.7105 + 0.05 
(-53.16) (4.02) (-2.41) (0.10) 
14. Monetary system net foreign assets (NSFAP) = ~.15NOXNP -9.36 
(5.94) ( - 1.47) 
15. Oil sector gross domestic product (OGDPNP) = 16.70VPE + 15.84TT- 20.9303 -15.21 
(2.73) (5.77) (-3.80) (-4.65) 
16. Non-oil gross domestic product (NOXNP) = 0.37KP t 0.059EMPT - 7.24 
(15.40) (5.71) (-3.66) 
17. Gross domestic product (GDPNP) = 23.54VPE + 10.97TT -6.66 
(3.93) (4.97) (-2.73) 
Nominal-Monetary Block 
18. Government deposits in banking system (SGD) = l.23GENAN + 7.96 
(9.16) (1.16) 
19. Reserve money (SRM) = 0.21GENAN + 0.076SGD + 1.21 
(3.42) (2.63) (0.87) 
· 20. Money supply (M2) = 0.80SRM + 0.26GENANL + 0.33 
(17.67) (13.31) (1.01) 
DW = 1.65; Se = 0.49 
DW = 1.75; Se= 0.23 
DW = 2.46; Se = 0.89 
DW = 2.27; Se= 0.42 
DW = 1.84; Se= 0.37 
DW = 2.59; Se = 2.53 
DW = 1.20; Se = 1.27 
DW = 1.08; Se = 6.38 
DW = 0.49; Se = 3.47 
DW = 2.10; Se= 4.18 
DW = 0.78; Se= 4.37 
DW = 1.92; Se = 0.22 
DW = I.I 9; Se = 0.22 
DW = 0.60; Se= 14.93 
DW = 1.69; Se = 5.45 
DW = 2.07; Se = 6.57 
DW = 0.98; Se = 5.42 
DW = 0.63; Se= 25.78 
DW = 1.24; Se= 5.06 
DW = 1.98; Se= 1.17 
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Table 7. Continued 
Price Indices 
21. Non-oil GDP deftator (NODF) = 0.035M2L +0.096NOXNP+ 0.12IGPL+ 1.1103 + 0.76 DW = 1.92; Se = 0.09 
(3.29) (4.64) (1.90) (12.03) (17.61) 
22. Gross domestic product deflator (GDPDF) = l.19CPI + 0.160ILP-0.34 
(10.44) (I 1.43) (-97) 
DW = 1.74; Se= 0.19 
23. Consumer price index (CPI)= l.51EXCESSEL + 0.62DI + 0.62 
(8.15) (4.19) (8.31) 
Identities 
24. Total consumption (TCNP) = PCNP + GCNP 
25. Total investment (TINP) = !PP+ IGP 
26. Gross capital formation (GCF) = TINP + ISNP +!OP 
27. Gross national product (GNP)= GDPNP + NFPP 
28. Total savings (SNP) = GNP - TCNP 
29. Domestic resource gap (SI)= SNP - GCF 
30. External resource gap (EM) = EP + ZNANP + NFPP 
31. Terms of trade (TT)= EUV/ICEUV 
32. Domestic absorption (ABP) = TCNP + TINP 
33. Excess monetary pressure (EXCESSE) = M2/ABP 
Exogenous Variables 
34. Government investment (!GP)= Design variable 
35. Crude petroleum production index (CPP) = 1.00 
36. Oil price (OILP = $30 per barrel 
37. Volume petroleum exports (VPE) 1975 = 100.0 
38. Industrial country export unit value (ICEUV) 1970 = 100.0 
39. Labor force (EMPT) 
40. Export unit (EUV) 1970 = 100.0 
force-labor force (EMPT) set at an average annual 
growth of 1.16% per annum. 
NATURE OF OPTIMUM CONTROL 
The macro model is the key element in the opti-
mum control exercises [10). The literature on opti-
mum control is highly technical, yet the concept itself 
is straightforward. The essential idea of optimal 
control is precisely to derive the optimal policy in 
order to steer the economy to the specified targets. A 
necessary step in applying control theory is to specify 
an objective function or a welfare loss function by 
which the outcome associated with the optimal policy 
or its alternatives can be evaluated. Given the welfare 
loss function and a dynamic model, a policy sequence 
can be found minimizing the expectation of the 
welfare loss for a given time horizon. In the present 
case where the welfare loss function is quadratic and 
the dynamic system is linear, the solution takes the 
form of a linear feedback control equation. That is to 
say, the optimal policy is a linear function of lagged 
endogenous variables and the exogenous factors in-
cluding the target values of the target variables. 
Once the objective function is determined the pro-
gramming model together with the objective func-
tions can be used to derive the optimal policy [11). 
The optimal policy so derived does not req.uire any 
further consistency check as required in the con-
ventional programming exercises which usually do 
not make use of a well defined objective function and 
a simultaneous equation model. 
While it is recognized that there are many particu-
larly political elements which are not included in the 
calculations but which are nevertheless imperative in 
making a policy decision, policies derived within the 
-----···-- -- ___ _, __ 
DW = 1.19; Se = 0.22 
framework of optimal control have the merit of 
logical consistency and compatability. 
The welfare loss function is specified in quadratic 
form as: 
1 n 
W =1 1~ (Y,- Y:) 1 Ky(Y,- Yn 
where Y~ indicates the target values of Y,; Ky is a 
diagonal matrix of rank q with q indicating the 
number of targets and n is the specified time horizon. 
The elements in the K-matrix indicate the weights of 
penalty which are attached to the squared deviations 
between the actual values and the targets values of 
the target variables. The deterministic optimal con-
trol problem for the kingdom is therefore to find xy 
which minimizes the welfare loss functions given the 
macroeconomic relationships depicting the country's 
main economic linkages. 
It should be noted that in most of the exercises 
described below, there was equality between the 
number of targets and the number of control vari-
ables so that the optimal policy solution was unique, 
not depending on the K-matrix (given the targets 
selected were compatible for the given set of control 
variables and that the control variables were indepen-
dently and indefinitely variable. 
SIMULATION METHODOLOGY 
Utilizing the macroeconomic model presented 
above, the optimum control simulations were de-
signed to test the consistency of the third five year 
plan's major objectives. Real government investment 
was selected as the instrument variable in each of the 
simulations on the assumption that the Saudi author-
ities will continue to have more control over capital 
expenditure than current expenditures (salaries, etc.). 
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Of course, this could change if the government 
decides to reduce military spending as part of a 
post-oil price decline austerity measure. Still, past 
government austerity measures (i.e. 1976-1977) have 
been characterized more by a postponement of new 
capital projects than either wage or public employ-
ment freezes. The same applies to military ex-
penditures. 
For purposes of the simulations the major eco-
nomic objectives of the third plan are dichotomized 
into: 
(I) a growth objective-real non-oil gross domestic 
product increasing at a minimum acceptable rate of 
6.19% per annum over the 1980-1985 period; 
(2) a social objective-the labor force increasing at 
a maximum of 1.16% per annum, reflecting the policy 
makers priority of gradually reducing the kingdom's 
dependence on foreign workers; 
(3) a stability of absorptive capacity objective 
operationally specified as a rate of inflation less than 
10%, and preferably in the 7-8% rartge; and 
(4) an ideological objective-that of the private 
sector gradually replacing government involvement 
in an essentially free market economy-the share of 
private sector activity relative to government activity 
should begin to increase fairly rapidly, particularly in 
light of the completion of the kingdom's devel-
opment. The actual target of private to government 
involvement in the economy has never been articu-
lated by the Saudi authorities. Realistically, however, 
it makes sense for purposes of simulatic~n to set as a 
target the rough balance between private and govern-
ment expenditure existing prior to the 1973 oil boom, 
i.e. around one to one (compared with the 1980 ratio 
of private to government expenditures of 0.66). 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
The first set of simulations were made on the 
assumption that the Saudi authorities are determined 
to implement a strategy of gradual reduction in the 
foreign work force, i.e. that a labor force growth 
target of only 1.16 average annual rate of increase 
would be adhered to under all circumst.ances arising 
during the third plan period. 
The simulated growth paths produced by the opti-
mal control program (Table 8) illustrate several fun-
damental trade-offs likely to confront the Saudi 
policy makers throughout the third plan period and 
possibly well into the fourth plan period (1985-1990): 
(I) it is clearly apparent that high growth (6.19% 
per annum and above), price stability (inflation under 
10% per annum), increased private sector par-
ticipation in the economy, and a significant reduction 
in the foreign work force are incompatible objectives; 
(2) real income growth in the target range (6.19% 
per annum) will be difficult to sustain without incur-
ring double digit inflation (paths I, II and VI); 
(3) a significant increase in the relative share of 
private sector expenditures can occur only at a great 
cost in terms of reduced real over-all non-oil gross 
domestic product growth (paths III and IV); 
(4) similarly, inflation can be constrained at mod-
erate rates (5-10% per annum) only at the cost of 
significantly reduced real income growth (paths III, 
IV); 
(5) the best compromise among policy objectives 
(assuming each has more or less equal pri_ority) 
appears to be one of moderate growth-non-oil 
income expansion in the 5% range, under conditions 
of minimum inflation (path V). If followed, this path 
would not only assure sustained real income increases 
but, perhaps more importantly, would also allow 
price stability to be maintained while meeting the 
foreign labor force objectives of the government. At 
the same time there would be a significant increase in 
the relative participation of the private sector in the 
economy (increasing its ratio to government ex-
penditures from 0.66 in 1980 to 0.91 by 1985. 
It should be noted that growth paths I through VI 
Table 8. Saudi Arabia: alternative growth strategies under labor force constraints 1981-1985 (average and 
growth rates) 
Growth strategy II III IV v VI 
Non-oil GDP 7.8 6.19 1.0 1.3 5.0 6.19 
Private consumption 5.4 9.2 11.3 11.8 13.9 12.6 
Private investment 4.1 4.9 2.4 2.4 4.0 5.1 
Private expenditures 5.1 I I.I 9.4 9.8 11.2 10.9 
• Government investment 14.1 4.7 -4.6 -6.4 -1.3 6.7 
Government consumption 11.9 9.2 1.7 I.I 6.9 9.8 
Government expenditures 12.8 7.4 -0.7 -1.7 3.8 8.6 
Non-oil deflator JO.I 13.2 5.1 5.0 11.8 13.5 
Ratio-private government 
expenditure (J 985) 0.44 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.69 
Notes: Average annual growth of labor force held at 1.16% in all strategies. 
Growth Strategy Assumptions: 
I High growth with price stability-non-oil gross domestic product deflator maximum= 10% per 
annum; maximum rate of increase in non-oil GDP. 
II Third plan target growth under minimum inflation conditions-target growth in non-oil 
GDP= 6.19%; minimize inflation. 
III High private sector participation with growth-ratio private to government expenditures equal to 
one by 1985; maximum rate of growth. 
IV High private sector participation with price stability-ratio private to government expenditures equal 
to one by 1985; minimize inflation. 
V Moderate growth-high stability plan-target rate of non-oil GDP= 5.0%; minimize inflation. 
VI Third Plan growth target with maximum private sector participation-non-oil GDP growth = 6.19% 
per annum; maximize private-government expenditure ratio. 
" • 
.. 
Table 9. Saudi Arabia: minimum patterns of inflation over alternative growth paths 1981-1985 (average annual growth rates) 
,Non-oil gross domestic product Non-oil gross domestic product 
Growth target 10.0 Growth target 8.0 
Average annual rate of increase in labor force Average annual rate of increase in labor force 
1.16 2.0 3.0 4.0 s.o 1.16 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 
Non-oil GDP 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.1 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Private consumption 13.6 13.0 11.8 13.4 14.2 11.6 13.7 12.4 14.4 13.5 
Private investment 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.7 5.5 5.5 5.6 6.5 5.7 
Private expenditure 12.l 11.5 10.6 11.8- 12.5 10.2 11.9' 10.8 12.6 11.7 
Government investment 11.7 12.4 13.9 10.9 9.7 10.9 7.0 9.4 8.9 5.9 
Government consumption 14.9 14.6 14.2 13.0 12.3 12.4 11.0 11.0 11.7 9.0 
Government expenditures 13.7 13.8 14.1 12.2 11.3 11.8 9.4 10.4 10.6 7.7 
Non-oil defiator 18.9 18.0 16.5 16.2 15.8 15.3 15.8 14.3 16.1 11.9 
Ratio, private-government 
expenditures 0.58 0.56 0.53 0.61 0.66 0.58 0.70 0.64 0.68 0.75 
Non-oil gross domestic product Non-oil gross domestic product 
Growth target 6.19 Growth target 4.0 
Non-oil GDP 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.8 7.9 3,4 3.9 4.5 5.2 5.8 
Private consumption 12.9 12.2 16.4 13.4 12.7 11.0 11.5 12.0 12.5 13.0 
Private investment 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.8 5.6 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.3 5.6 
Private expenditure 11.2 10.5 13.9 11.5 I I.I 8.4 9.7 10.2 10.7 I I.I 
Government investment 4.7 5.4 -6.3 4.4 9.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Government consumption 9.2 8.8 6.5 8.1 IO.I 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 
Government expenditures 7.4 7.5 2.0 6.8 9.7 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Non-oil defiator 13.2 11.6 13.I 12.1 12.9 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.7 
Ratio, private-government 





















Table IO. Saudi Arabia: maximUlt) participation of the private sector over alternative growth paths 1981-1985 (average annual growth rates) 
Inftationary constraint 14.5 lnftationary constraint 12.5 
Average annual rate of increase in labor force Average annual rate of increase in labor force' 
1.16 2.0 3.0 4.0 s.o 1.16 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 
Non-oil GDP 8.6 8.9 9.5 10.1 10.6 7.2 7.5 8.1 8.6 9.2 
Private consumption 9.0 10.3 9.9 10.5 11.0 8.5 10.5' 9.8 10.1 11.7 
Private investment 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.3 6.5 4.6 5.1 5.1 5.3 6.0 
Private expenditures 7.2 9.2 9.0 9.2 10.0 7.6 9.2 8.8 9.0 10.4 
Government investment • 14.7 13.3 14.6 14.6 14.5 12.3 10.3 11.9 12.5 10.9 
Government consumption 13.7 13.3 13.6 13.6 13.6 11.6 I I.I I 1.5 11.4 11.3 ~ 
Government expenditures 13.9 13.3 14.0 13.8 13.9 I 1.9 10.8 11.7 11.6 I I. I 0 
Non-oil deftator 14.5 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.7 12.0 12.5 12.3 12.2 12.7 ; 
-'! 
Ratio, private-government tT1 
expenditures 0.47 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.60 ~ lnftationary constraint 10.0 Inflationary constraint 7.5 Non-oil GDP 5.6 6.5 7.0 7.6 8.2 3.4 3.8 7.4 5.0 8.6 
Private consumption 9.1 10.5 11.0 11.4 11.8 10.2 10.7 1.9 11.3 2.6 
Private investment 3.8 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.4 3.1 3.3 2.9 3.8 3.4 
Private expenditures 7.9 8.2 9.6 10.0 10.4 8.6 9.1 2.1 9.6 2.5 
Government investment 8.1 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8 2.5 2.3 17.5 2.6 16.9 
Government consumption 9.0 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.7 5.5 5.4 11.2 5.2 11.5 
Government expenditures 8.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 4.3 4.2 13.3 4.2 13.9 
Non-oil deflator 9.9 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.3 7.5 
Ratio, private-government 
expenditures (1985) 0.60 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.76 0.78 0.37 0.80 0.37 
Table 11. Saudi Arabia: maximum participation of the private sector over alternative growth paths 1981-1985 (average annual growth rates) 
Non-oil gross domestic product Non-oil gross domestic product 
Growth target 8.0 Growth target 6.19 
Average annual rate of increase in labor force Average annual rate of increase in labor force 
1.16 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 1.16 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 
Non-oil GDP 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.0 8.0 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.19 
Private consumption 12.9 13.3 13.8 13.9 14.3 12.6 12.8 13.1 13.3 13.3 
Private investment 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 . 6.0 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.8 Vl 
Private expenditures 11.3 11.7 12.I 12.2 12.4 10.9 JO.I 11.3 11.5 11.4 "' i:: 
Government investment 9.9 9.1 8.1 7.0 5.9 6.7 5.8 4.8 3.6 2.7 e: 
Government consumption• 12.4 11.7 11.0 JO.I 9.2 9.8 9.1 8.3 7.3 6.3 > ..., 
Government expenditures 11.4 10.7 9.8 8.9 7.9 8.6 7.8 6.9 5.8 4.9 "' ;: 
Non-oil deftator 16.I 15.6 15.0 14.1 13.2 13.5 12.8 11.9 10.9 9.6 "'. 
Ratio, private-government e: 
expenditures 0.62 0.65 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.72 0.76 0.81 0.84 a 
Non-oil gross domestic product Non-oil gross domestic product ::ti 
Growth target 4.0 Growth target 2.0 ~ 
'< 
Non-oil GDP 4.0 4.0 4.5 5.1 5.7 1.9 0.1 1.9 0.9 0.1 "' 
"' 
...,
Private consumption 11.5 11.8 12.2 12.6 13.1 10.3 9.3 10.2 10.5 11.2 't:I 
Private investment 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.6 2.5 1.6 2.4 1.9 1.7 s;-::s 
Private expenditures 9.7 10.7 10.3 10.8 12.3 8.5 7.6 8.5 8.8 9.2 
Government investment 3.0 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 -1.5 -4.2 -2.8 -7.6 -12.4 
Government consumption 6.6 5.8 5.4 5.4 5.4 2.8 -0.4 1.2 -2.1 -5.1 
Government expenditures 5.2 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.9 I.I -1.9 -0.4 -4.2 -7.8 
Non-oil deflator 9.6 8.8 8.4 8.5 8.7 5.3 1.4 3.1 0.8 -1.3 
Ratio, private-government 
expenditures 0.77 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.99 0.95 1.18 1.45 
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are financially feasible at oil prices of $25 a bar~el. or 
more, and production rates above 5 m!lhon 
barrels/day. If the price and or production rates fall 
below these values, the rate of liquidation of the 
kingdom's overseas asset or portfolio would also 
have to be treated as a policy goal, and simulations 
made with this added constraint. 
Depending on how one views things, the sim_u-
lations are either encouraging or somewhat dis-
turbing. With regard to the latter, it is readily appa!-
ent that without fundamental structural changes m 
the economy (together with unprecedented rat~s of 
increase in labor productivity) the kingdom will be 
unable to achieve its third plan objectives by simply 
throwing more money on infrastructure and related 
projects. 
On the other hand the picture is likely to change 
fairly drastically if the authorities are willing to relax 
their policy on foreign workers. This latter hypothesis 
was tested through a series of optimum control 
simulations assuming: (I) fixed growth targets (Table 
9); (2) inflationary ceilings (Table IO); and prioi;ity 
towards relative rates of private sector expansion 
(Table 11). 
With the labor force expanding from the third plan 
targeted rate of 1.16-5.0% per annum it appears 
(Table 9) that: 
(I) some inflationary pressures can be reduced with 
a greater than planned infusion and or retainment of 
foreign workers; 
(2) with the labor force increasing in the 4-5% 
range, a rate of around 6% real growth might _be 
achieved with inflation held around 8% together with 
a gradual increase in the relative share of private 
sector participation; 
(3) growth rates of 8% and over are clea~ly ~n­
desirable under any reasonable labor force pohcy, 1.e. 
expansion in this range would produce unacceptable 
levels of inflation together with a likely decline in the 
relative participation of the private sector in the 
economy. 
In general, these results are reinforced by the 
results obtained by simulations identifying the max-
imum non-oil gross domestic product growth rates 
(Table 10) attainable under alternative inflationary 
constraints: 
(!) rates of growth in the 6-7% range m~y be 
possible at the expense of relative private sector 
expansion; 
(2) significant private sector expansion seems possi-
ble only under greatly reduced over-all growth condi-
tions. 
More specifically (Table 11) with regard to relative 
private sector expansion: 
(l) relative private sector expansion is facilitated at 
higher labor force growth rates; . . . 
(2) significant increase in the relative contnbutlon 
of the private sector to expenditures can be obtained 
only at the expense of over all income growth; 
(3) moderate increases in the relative degree ~f 
private sector participation in the economy are poss1-
ble over fairly high non double digit inflationary 
growth paths. 
CONCLUSION 
The above analysis had described a number of 
growth paths projections which differ from the orig-
inal third plan targets, primarily because of alterna-
tive changed assumptions regarding the rate of 
growth in the labor force. As detailed earlier, the 
changes in labor force, capital stock and productivity 
assumptions required for these simulations are clearly 
within reasonable (albeit perhaps politically sensitive) 
bounds. 
The situations explore the sensitivity of the econ-
omy to variations in policy priorities and are de-
pendent on the way in which the variations are 
achieved. For example, if the same change in real 
output were achieved under reduced inflationary 
conditions, it is likely that the private sector could 
achieve a somewhat larger relative role in the econ-
omy, but at the expense of an increased number of 
foreign workers. 
These caveats merely imply that there are no 
unique bounds to the kingdom's growth path over 
the third five year plan period. Any growth path 
ultimately selected will implicitly be at the expense of 
one of the plan's major priorities. 
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